"The focus of this research was on one approach toward predicting task retention and refresher training requirements--self assessment. Prior to zeroing their weapons for annual MI6AI rifle qualification (record fire), 153
Introduction
Most Army jobs require that soldiers achieve and maintain proficiency on .
scores of tasks. Because of resource constraints it is impossible to train every soldier on every task to the degree necessary even to minimize be "forgetting. As a result, some amount of periodic refresher training must be provided. This much is clear. What is not clear is how frequently individuals require refresher training to sustain proficiency on particular "tasks. As Schendel and Hagman (1982) indicate, if time intervals between successive sessions are too long, then performance may fall below acceptable levels and entail considerable risk. Emergencies may arise requiring corrective action before an individual has had a chance to retrain. If time -intervals between sessions are too short, then administrative costs necessarily are inflated.
"What can be done to remedy this problem? One possible approach toward managing refresher training involves the use of self assessments . Under this approach, priorities would be assigned to tasks to be trained (managerial )t Idecision).
Unit commanders then would determine where they are weakest, next weakest, etc by sampling soldiers' estimated skill levels on these tasks. Priorities would be weighed against weaknesses as well as resources (time, ,-.°t ravel requirements, equipment constraints, etc) and unit refresher training schedules developed accordingly.
Of course, self assessments need not be used alone. They may be used to identify soldiers requiring training on particular 01 tasks and, consequently,, may be used to refine predictions derived from other, -[ more generalized approaches (e.g., Rose & Ford, 1982) .
The advantages of the self assessment approach are that it is simple and economical--self assessments can be collected using only a questionnaire. Self assessments also can be very accurate (e.g., Levine, Flory, & Ash, 1977) . The main disadvantage of self assessments is that they are subject to distortion, both intentional and unintentional. For example, the stereotype "of a "good soldier" may influeuce self assessments. As a result, soldiers may "be reluctant to admit needing training on tasks which they should know.
Alternatively, soldiers may unintentionally overestimate their abilities to perform a task as a result of their overconfidence.
Several methods for handling these problems are discussed later in this report. Many of these methods also have been covered by Burnside (1982) .
This research examines the feasibility of using self assessments in predicting soldiers' task retention and refresher training requirements.
Sub leers "
The subjects were 153 male (n -147) and female (a-6) permanent party soldiers assigned to the ist and 2d Infantry Training Brigades and Infantry Zeroing involves firing series of three-round shot groups at a specially designed 25-meter target and adjusting "the rifle's sights until point of bullet impact coincides with point of aim. "Prior to zeroing, soldiers assembled in bleachers to receive a safety ___ briefing. After soldiers had assembled in the bleachers but before they had received this briefing, they were informed about the purpose of this research. Sub-ects were told werely to answer the questions as accurately as possible.
"No special instructions were provided about the meanings of questions nor were possibl.e responses discussed.
Performance data. After zeroing, all soldiers were transported M16A1 rifle qualification range. On arriving, each subject was assigne, randomly to one of eight firing lanes. All scoring was done by independ, support personnel. These personnel were fully informed about scoring procedures and the purpose of this research prior to the onset of testing. In addition, an experimenter and numerous range personnel were available to assist in scorekeeping and to answer questions.
The course-of-fire consisted of 14 "F-type" silhouettes and 26 "E-type" silhouettes.
F-type silhouettes are designed to appear like the head and shoulders of a man and were seen at 50 (D = 5) and 100 (n -9) meters. E-type silhouettes, designed to appear like the head and torso of a man, appeared at 150 ( 1 -10), 200 (n -8), 250 (n -5), and 300 (a -3) meters.
The first half of this course was shot from the foxhole supported position; the second half from the prone unsupported position, Targets fell when hit. Record fire scores and related shooting classifications are as follows: 0 to '?.
22-Unqualified; 23 to 29--Marksman; 30 to 35--Sharpshooter; 36 to 40--Expert.
Results
Pearson correlation coefficients (is) first were computee on all subjects' questionnaire and record fire data. Subjects' predicted and actual record fire scores correlated positively, I -.26 (u -150, p < .01). A similar result was obtained when computing the K between subjects' predicted shootina classifications and their actual classifications, r -.25 (n -152, 2 < .01).
While these rs appear low, they were much stronger than others which we expected may be quite, strong. For example, reported experience outside the A':my firing a rifle or a shotgun failed to correlate with performance at recvrd fire, . --. 10 (U -152, R > .05).
One of the best predictors of record fire performance was soldiers' remembered shooting classifications from their most recent record fire, r -.38 (n -133), R < .01).
Remembered most recent record fire scores also correlated with record fire performance, r -.29 (L -121, p < .01).
Also, remembered classifications and scores related highly to those predicted. Remembered classifications correlated r -.65 (u -132, y < .01) with predicted classifications and r " .53 (n -130, p < .01) with predicted scores; remembered scores correlated r -.67 (n -120, R < .01) with predicted classifications and r -.63 (a -118, p < .01) witb predicted scores.
More extensive analyses then were carried out on questionnaire data corrected for internal consistency. This correction involved determining whether each subject's response to the question "How many targets out of 40 do you think you will hit at record fire?" was consistent with his (or her) responses to the following questions: "What is the hlhest number of targets out of 40 you feel you are likely to hit today?" "What is the lowest number of targets out of 40 you feel you are likely to hit today? For example, if a subject indicated he (she) believed he (she) was going to hit 27 targets at record fire, but then indicated that the highest (lowest) number of targets he (she) felt likely to hit was less (more) than 27, the subject's data were not included in the analyses that follow.
Most of the rs computed following this correction were similar in magnitude and direction to the rs reported above. Particularly noteworthy, however, was the r between soldiers' predicted and actual record fire scores which showed some improvement, r -.32 (a -124, U <.01). In addition, the between reported months since last record fire and record fire performance achieved significance, I --. 19 (a -123, R < .05).
Reported months since last record fire should correlate negatively with record fire performance, at least to the degree that this variable reflects the length of the in\rerval between successive refresher training periods. 587 587.
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As indicated earlier, subjects were asked to predict their shooting classifications.
They also were asked to estimate their chances of being correct in these predictions.
In general, subjects who estimated their chances of being correct at 90% or 100% were more accurate in their predictions than subjects who gave lower confidence estimates.
In particular, predicted shooting classifications znd record fire scores correlated r --.01
-36, 2 > .05) for subjects who estimated their chances of accurate prediction at less than 60%.
This r was .24 (n -47, .05 < p < .10) for subjects who estimated their chances of accurate prediction as being between 60% and 80%.
And, r equalled .42 (a-41, p < .01) for subjects who estimated the likelihood of accurate prediction at 90% or 100%. Similarly, the rs between predicted and actual record fire scores were nonsignificant for subjects who estimated their chances of accurate prediction at less than 60%, S-.23 (P -36, p > .05) or between 60% and 80%, .r -.04 (a -47, p > .05).
However, this I was highly significant for subjects who estimated their "chances of accurate prediction at 90% or 100%, r -.50 (D -41, R < .01).
Estimation errors (i.e., algebraic errors) were inversely related to record fire scores, r --.73 (.u -124, p < .01). An examination of these errors indicated that the predictions of subjects who fired well at record fire, generally, were more accurate than those who fired poorly. This "suggests that subjects who performed well also were more skilled at self assessment.
On the other hand, this result may merely reflect a general tendency to overestimate shooting ability: 75% of the subjects predicted they would hit more targets than they actually hit. If most subjects thought they would do well, good shooters naturally would show less error in their predictions than poor shooters.
Only five (4%) subjects predicted that they were going to fail to qualify (i.e., hit less than 23 ta.'gets). Actually, 34 (27%) subjects failed. More interestingly, however, three of the five subjects who predicted that they were going to fail did in fact fail. And, the remaining two who passed, passed only by two points. Conclusions are limited by the small sample size.
However, this result suggests that, while subjects were biased heavily toward predicting success, those who predicted failure were quite accurate.
Discussion
Correlations between predicted and actual scores were not high.
At best, predictions accounted for only about 10% of the variance associated with record fire scores. Nevertheless, these data must be regarded as encouraging "for the following reasons:
Record fire scores are notoriously unreliable. Equipment failure, scorer bias, variations in light conditions, vegetation, and terrain all contribute to this unreliability (e.g., Marcus & Hughas, 1979) .
No special instructions were provided subjects as they completed the p...
questionnaire.
The idea was to obtain a baseline estimate of soldiers abilities to assess their own skills under field conditions.
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The data appear logically consistent. Predicted and actual performances correlated positively as did predicted and remembered performances.
The correlation between predicted and actual scores showed some improvement when data were corrected for internal consistency.
And, subjects who expressed the most confidence in their predictions also were most accurate.
Future research should focus on the problem of improving the accuracy of subjects' self assessments.
Several manipulations already are known to improve this accuracy (e.g., Burnside, 1982) .
Our experience conducting this research suggests at least three further manipulations:
1. Provide subjects as much information relevant to the formation of accurate self assessments 4s possible.
This information itj conveyed largely by descriptions of the task, conditions, and standards.
However, it also may be beneficial to remind subjects how they did previously or to refresh their memories for a task using a demonstration. .
2.
Have subjects provide confidence ratings along with their self assessments.
Confidence ratings appear a good inde7-of the accuracy of these assessments.
In this research, the predicted scores of subjects who estimated their chances of accurate prediction at 90% or 100% accounted for 25% of the X.." ,variance associated with record fire scores. Similar results have been obtained by Fischhoff and MacGregor (1981) .
3.
Instruct subjects to check their responses for internal consistency as they complete their self-assessment questionnaires.
